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Rising inequality in recent decades in the U.S. and other developed economies has again focused attention 
on the relationship between inequality and growth, and the relationship between inequality and 
heterogeneity in abilities. This paper is a preliminary report based on the analysis of data extracted from 
the tax returns (the taille) imposed by Philip the Fair from 1292 to 1313 on the Parisian middle class. The 
major finding reported in this paper is that inequality in Paris in the heyday of the Commercial Revolution 
was very high – a Gini coefficient of 0.7. The medieval Gini coefficient is larger than values recorded for 
Latin American. Inequality was general and was not confined to one sector or the other. As theory would 
predict, this inequality was reflected also in large skill and ability premiums and was higher in the high 
return occupations. Inequality was also very high in skilled occupations controlled by craft guilds such as 
weaving or construction. I also focus on the very wealthy and show that the elite were very socially 
mobile. Studying death rates of tax payers accounted for in the tax  rolls, I find the death rate to be 
comparable with that 19
th century Europe. The overall picture that emerges is that the Parisian economy 
of the late middle ages provided ample incentives for the acquisition of human capital and rewarded 
ability and skill, and in that respect was closer into the information age economy of today. 
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Foundation for supporting this research. Introduction 
Rising inequality in recent decades in the U.S. and other developed economies has again focused 
attention on the relationship between inequality and growth, and the relationship between 
inequality and heterogeneity in abilities
1.  The stylized relationship between inequality and 
growth was conceptualized by what is called, the “Kuznets Curve” (Kuznets, 1955).  The curve 
has an inverted U-shape that suggests that in early stages of economic development, as income 
increases, inequality rises because workers move from low productivity and higher inequality 
traditional occupations to the higher productivity and lower inequality industry. Rising inequality 
in advanced countries today on the one hand, and declining inequality in developing (especially 
Eastern European) economies on the other hand, seem to have refuted the simple Kuznets 
hypothesis.  
Recent attempts at reconciling the failure of the simple Kuznets hypothesis to fit the data have 
tended to focus on differences in skill and ability in the process of economic growth. Galor and 
Tsiddon (1997) suggest that the in the process of economic growth, there emerges a transitory 
difference in wages of skilled versus unskilled labor. Owen and Weil (1998) suggest that capital 
market constraints may lead to differences in education that affect income distribution. Finally, 
recent models, such as Galor and Moav (2000), emphasize the role of ability in generating 
inequality. They argue, that in a period of technological innovation the return to ability increases 
and leads to higher inequality. Moreover, inequality may contribute to economic growth by 
providing incentives to acquire education. 
                                                 
1 See Gottschalk (1997), Bresnahan (1999) and Galor Moav (2000)   2 
The common factor underlying recent explanations of inequality is related to the rising 
importance of human capital in the production process in developed economies. The rise of 
human capital is considered in the new growth literature as a recent phenomenon – which 
followed the age of the classical industrial production function which was based on capital and 
standardized labor inputs.  
The findings and theoretical developments in the recent growth literature will not surprise 
students of the early modern European economy. The Commercial Revolution of the middle ages 
(1000-1350) was a period of rapid economic and demographic growth. It was characterized by 
urbanization and high degree of labor mobility. New industries and occupations sprouted and 
market institutions emerged. In many respects, the profound economic change brought about 
during the Commercial Revolution resembles the information technology revolution, to which 
the growth literature refers.  
The heart of the Commercial Revolution was the medieval city – a vibrant urban economy which 
was comprised of economic sectors that characterize modern contemporary cities: a large service 
sector from banks to hotels and restaurants, a large retail sector, small industry employing skilled 
workers and sometimes educational institutes and state bureaucracy. Like any city it also 
attracted many migrants, vagabonds and criminals. Though growth theories refer mainly to the 
post Industrial Revolution age, sometimes characterizing the early modern period as one of 
stagnation, the Commercial Revolution offers a fertile ground to test growth theories on the one 
hand and to employ them to understand the complex economic interactions of the period on the 
other hand. Economic historians analyzed, almost exclusively, inequality in the 19
th and 20
th 
centuries, mainly relating to the debate of the standard of living during around the industrial   3 
revolution. 
2 A comparative view is provided on Brenner, Kaeble and Thomas (1991), More 
recently Van Zanden (1995) provides a comparative analysis, with a focus on Holland, that 
extends back to the 15
th century. He shows that over a very long period (1427 to the 19
th century) 
inequality in large cities was very high, suggesting that there existed a Kuznets ‘super curve’, 
whereby in pre-modern Europe growth was associated with rising inequality.   
This paper is a preliminary report based on the analysis of data extracted from the tax returns 
(the taille) imposed by Philip the Fair from 1292 to 1313 on the Parisian middle class. The major 
finding reported in this paper is that inequality in Paris in the heyday of the Commercial 
Revolution was very high – a Gini coefficient of 0.7. The medieval Gini coefficient is larger than 
values recorded for Latin American countries such as Brazil with 0.61
3. Inequality was general 
and was not confined to one sector or the other. As theory would predict, this inequality was 
reflected also in large skill and ability premiums and was higher in the high return occupations. 
Inequality was also very high in skilled occupations controlled by craft guilds such as weaving or 
construction. The picture that emerges is that the Parisian economy of the late middle ages 
provided ample incentives for the acquisition of human capital and rewarded ability and skill. 
Few pervious studies have made use of tax assessment data to infer about income or wealth 
distribution in early modern Europe. The most important study is of the famous Florentine 
catasto of 1427. (Herlihy (1967) and Herlihy Klapisch (1978)), which is available in machine 
readable form. French data have been, on the other hand, little explored. Favier (1970), has 
utilized tax roles from Paris for the years 1421, 1423 and 1438 to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of occupations and wealth. The data include only the wealthy citizens comprising in 
                                                 
2 Lindert and Williamson (1983) and Williamson (1988) for the Industrial revolution and Jackson (1994) who 
challenged Lindert and Williamson. 
3 World Bank, World development  indicators,  2002.   4 
total about 2,400 people.  The tax rolls analyzed in this paper have been studied by Bourlet 
(1992) mainly for the purpose of an antroponominic study and Herlihy (1995) who analyzed the 
1292 and 1313 tax rolls and briefly addressed issues related to immigration , occupations and 
gender differences. However, probably owing to his premature death, Herlihy did not provide 
more than few summary statistics and did not computerize the data set.   
The paper is organized as follows: we begin, in Section II by describing the data source used in 
this paper, in section III we provide summary statistics that provide a glimpse into of the society 
and economy of Paris. In Section IV we analyze inequality measures, Section V concludes. 
 
II. The Parisian Tailles of Philip the Fair 
Our data is extracted from the tax rolls of the Taille imposed by Philip the Fair on Paris in 1292. 
There are seven existent rolls: 1292, 1296,7,8,9, 1300 and 1313. The first six correspond to the 
same imposition totaling  100,000 livres parisis to paid in installments. The last tax roll, of 1313,  
was earmarked to pay for the knighting of the prince, the future king Louis X. The tax was levied 
on artisans and entrepreneurs and excluded the nobility, clergy, students and professors, and the 
very poor. The tax rolls differ in coverage, (Table 1) the first -  1292 - being the largest, 
including all segments of the taxable population: The rich (gros) the poor (menus), the Jews 
(which were expelled in 1305) and the Lombards (Italians).  The smaller samples do not include 
the very poor and some neighborhoods outside the walls of the city.    5 
 
Table 1 
Number of tax payers in Parisian tax rolls  
Year  Number of persons 
1292  14566 
1296  5703 
1297  9930 
1313  6352 
Total  36551 
 
The tax was administered by the burghers themselves. The city was divided to Parishes and 
wards (queste )and for the most part, tax payers were listed according to residence. Each parish 
and each queste had a person responsible for the collection of the tax of his jurisdiction. It can be 
argued that this procedure produced a fair allocation of the tax burden – as it resolved 
information asymmetries and moral hazard problems
4. As we show later, it is reasonable to 
deduce from the data that taxation was proportional to wealth. The assessment unit was probably 
the hearth (Favier, 1970) and it was based on its wealth, as the notion of income (flow) was not 
developed at the time.  
The data was extracted from four published registers : Geraud (1837) for 1292, and Michaelsson 
(1951, 1958 and 1962) for 1313, 1292 and 1297 respectively. The data include the address of the 
                                                 
4 To be further developed in future work.   6 
tax payer, his name and sometimes his occupation and/or his place of origin. If not stated 
explicitly, some of the surnames can also be used to identify and occupation or origin. Finally we 
have the tax payer’s tax assessment.  
The classification of tax payers according to occupation and origin was done with help of the 
indices compiled by Geraud and Michaelson and by using contemporary geographical 
dictionaries
5. Furthermore, all occupations were classified into three capital and three skill 
categories: Skill: a) unskilled, b) skilled and c) skilled and general education.  Capital: a) no 
capital, b) circulating capital, c) productive capital. Occupations were also divided into major 
categories and major industries. Finally, for some observations we have an exact status 
identification: masters apprentices and day labor. The data also allow for the use of record 
linking, as many tax payers and their offspring or spouses appear in the various years. Once 
completed, it will be possible to update some of the identifiers that appear in one tax roll but not 
in others. More importantly it will allos us to conduct a dynamic study of the evolution, over a 
generation, of wealth and status. 
For comparison, we also applied a similar procedure to a smaller dataset based on tax rolls from 
London for 1292 and 1319, published by Ekwall (1951), which to our best knowledge has not 
been utilized by economic historians either. 
6 
                                                 
5 Places of origin that were not readily identified were coded separately. 
6 Ekwall’s data are not fully compiled as of yet, only summary statistics are reported in this version.   7 
III. Paris in the Heyday of the Commercial Revolution 
1. Parishes, wealth and taxpayers 
The Parisian tax rolls allow us to construct some summary statistics for Paris at the turn of the 
13
th century
7. The major question facing historians (recently, Favier, (1970) and Herlihy (1995)) 
was how large was the city’s population? The estimates range from 60,000 to 210,000. The most 
recent estimate by Herlihy(1995) tends to support the larger estimate,  which places Paris at the 
top of the list of European cities in the middle ages. The city was divided into 24 Parishes and 
some parishes were divided into wards (queste). In the 1292 tax roll, which is the most 
comprehensive we counted 382 streets and alleys. The 1292 tax roll was used by Geraud (1837)  
to construct a map of Paris during the reign of Philip the Fair (Map 1).  
Table 2 lists the Parishes of Paris and shows large variations in income (as measured by average 
tax) and population
8.  The city was roughly divided along income lines: the rive droite, had 
higher incomes than the rive gauche, and the center had larger incomes than neighborhoods 
outside the walls of the city
9. As today, the commercial center was on the rive droite and the 
university and the major monasteries and abbeys were on the left bank.  Since students, faculty 
and clergy were exempt from taxation, the population of taxpayers is significantly lower on the 
left bank. 
                                                 
7 Partial data were already presented by Herlihy(1995) and in Geraud (1837).  
8 Since the tax was proportional and excluded the poorest citizens, the selection bias produces a positive correlation 
between average tax and population size, for given area taxed.  
9 Even in parishes that spanned across the walls, such as St. Germain Le’Auxerrois, the wards outside the walls had 











1. St. Germain L’auxerrois   2. St. Eustache 3.  St. Sauver 4. St. Leu – St Gille 
 5. St Innocent – St, Opportune 6. St. Laurent 7. St. Josse 8. St. Nicolas des champ 9. St. Merri  
10. St. Jacques de la boucherie 11. St. Gervais 12. St. Jean 13. St. Pol 14. La Cite 15. St. Séverin    
16. St. André des arts 17. St. Cosme 18. St. Benoît 19. St. Hilaire 20. St. Nicolas de Chardonnay  21. 
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Table 2 
Wealth and taxed population size - Parisian parishes 
 











St. Germain L’auxerrois  rive droite, center  2328  19.3 800 
St. Eustache  rive droite, center  1306  17.7 1100 
St. Sauver  Rive droite, outside wall  230  6.1 58 
St. Leu – St Gille  rive droite,, outside wall  437  8.8 440 
St Innocent – St, Opportune  rive droite, center  82  11.9 140 
St. Laurent  rive droite, outside wall  213  7.6 70 
St. Josse  rive droite, center  73  11.6 90 
St. Nicolas des champs  Rive droite, outside wall  844  10.3 1080 
St. Merri  rive droite, center  1426  13.2 290 
St. Jacques de la boucherie  rive droite, center  1429  24.2 1080 
St. Gervais  rive droite, center  938  14.3 480 
St. Jean  rive droite, center  807  22.4 1650 
St. Pol  rive droite, center and outside 
wall. 
913  8.9 200 
La Cite  Center  1208  19.6 1880 
St. Séverin  rive gauche, center  664  9.8 200 
St. André des arts  rive gauche, center  146  6.5 80 
St. Cosme  rive gauche, center  59  7.3 50 
St. Benoît  rive gauche, center  219  14.4 200 
St. Hilaire  rive gauche, center  20  8.0 18 
St. Nicolas de Chardonnay  rive gauche, center  79  5.7 58 
Ste Geneviève  rive gauche,center  405  8.4 120 
Notre Dame des champs  rive gauche,outside wall  62  5.5   40 
St. Marcel  rive gauche,outside wall  231  4.0 120 
St. Germain des Près  rive gauche,outside wall  383  12.2 300   10 
 
2. The evolution of tax returns over time 
How did wealth assessment evolve over time? In table 3 we provide average tax payment in the 
various samples. Since the samples are not of even size, the average tax based on the wealthiest 
5,000 tax payers is provided. It is quite clear that the amount collected each year was similar and 
the burden was divided among the citizens in a method which gave exemptions to the poor (who, 
in any case provided little in terms of the total tax). The ‘top 5,000’ paid a similar tax (on 
average) and it is likely that years with fewer taxpayers, were probably bad years – with high 
food prices. It is known that from 1293-1295 grain prices were high and again around 1313 
(Jordan, 1996).  
Table 3 
Average tax and total tax receipts: 1292-1313 
 
Note: In 1313 the livre parisis was debased by 30 percent. The sums reported were deflated from the 
originals: 44.2, 53.7, and 13511.7 respectively.  
3. Occupations and Industries 
An interesting feature of the tax rolls is that they list the occupations of about 6500 people. 
Those excluded from the list are, on the one hand, the very poor and on the other hand the elite, 
Year 
Average tax  Average based on 
Top 5000 
Total tax receipts 
Livre parisis 
1292  16.9  43.9 12286.8 
1296  35.2  39.2 9958.2 
1297  20.9  38.3 10372.1 
1313  34.1  41.3 10393.6   11 
which was listed by surname or nickname rather than by occupation. This allows us to form a 
tentative profile of the occupation structure of Paris in the late middle ages
10. Table 4 presents 
the distribution of occupations by economic sector in terms of their relative size and income.   
Table 4 
Occupational structure – Paris 1297 
Occupation Population  share  average tax 
arts & crafts  2465  0.37 11.4 
Trade and finance  2283  0.34 18.7 
Professionals 512  0.08 12.5 
Labor 495  0.07 7.7 
Services 434  0.06 14.2 
Army and clergy  223  0.03 16.5 
Other 142  0.02 13.6 
Total classified  6654  0.66 14.1 
Total unclassified  3362  0.33 34.1 
It can be readily seen that the largest sectors were the medieval industrial sector and trade – the 
heart of the medieval urban economy. The wealth ranking follows the conventional view that 
merchants and the financial sector had the greatest wealth (and income) and dominated all other 
occupations. Those engaged in security, and belonged to the city militia or local police force and 
the clergy (mainly secular that was not exempt from taxation) which represented the traditional 
higher income feudal sectors ranked second to the merchants. They were followed by a. the 
service sector, comprised of personal services and the hotel and restaurant sector, b. the 
professional sector and c. free labor – mainly in construction. The distribution reported for 1297 
is very similar for other years in our sample.  
                                                 
10 The record linking process, which will link people across the years will allow us to identify more occupations than 
we have in the tax roll of 1297.   12 
It is interesting to note that the average wealth of those whose occupations were listed was 
substantially lower than of those whose occupations were not listed. As the listing of occupations 
was probably used to identify taxpayers, rather than provide a census of occupations, it seems 
natural that the identity of the wealthiest citizens was known by other means.  
An interesting exercise would be to try and map the occupation structure to the various city 
neighborhoods. Since we do not have a complete breakdown of the occupations we have to be 
cautious in interpreting the data. Table 5 reports the ratio of merchants to artisans in all the 
parishes and reports various highlights from breakdown of the occupations by parishes (which 
are too numerous to show).  The data confirm the assertion made above that the occupations of 
the more affluent citizens were not reported. The coverage ratio (population with known 
occupation divided by total population in the parish) is higher in the poorer neighborhoods. From 
the relatively high coverage ratio in the neighborhoods on the left bank,  and assuming that 
artisans were less likely not to be  included (owing to their relatively low income), it appears that 
most of the artisanal activity took place on the right bank.   We also note that in some of the low 
population parishes of the left bank we can find relatively high concentrations of labor and 
clergy (though these are small numbers).    13 
Table 5 
Occupations and residences – Paris 1297 
Parish Average 
tax   
(solidous 
parisis) 





St. Germain L’auxerrois  21.3  63%  0.65   
St. Eustache  18.7  57%  1.19   
St. Sauver  6.0  60%  0.63   
St. Leu – St Gille  8.9  80%  1.14   
St Innocent – St, Opportune  13.2  71%  1.3   
St. Laurent  7.5  57%  1.16   
St. Josse  11.9  87%  0.83  Services 13%; Military 7% 
St. Nicolas des champs  10.4  59%  0.63   
St. Merri  13.9  65%  0.82   
St. Jacques de la boucherie  27.1  60%  0.67   
St. Gervais  14.3  58%  0.76   
St. Jean  22.4  69%  1,09   
St. Pol  9.1  59%  0.77   
La Cite  21.4  76%  1.05  Services 12% 
St. Séverin  6.5  78%  1.48   
St. André des arts  6.5  70%  1.42  Services 15% 
St. Cosme  7.7  82%  1.71  Clergy 23% 
St. Benoît  14.6  85%  2.25   
St. Hilaire  8.3  81%  0.64  Labor 11% 
St. Nicolas de Chardonnay  5.7  77%  1.71  Labor 16% 
Ste Geneviève  8.5  80%  1.38   
Notre Dame des champs  5.4  26%  1.2   
St. Marcel  4.4  63%  3.45   
Note: Coverage is the ratio of listed occupation to total Parish population.   14 
4. Paris a cosmopolitan metropolis in decline? 
It is evident from the tax rolls that the Parisian economy attracted many migrants and foreigners. 
Unlike the privileges received by foreign nationals in other commercial centers (notably in the 
East), foreigners residing in Paris were not exempt from the taille and our records indicate that a 
few hundred of foreigners were recorded as having paid the taille. 
Table 6 
Contributions of foreign born residents to the tailles 
  Number of foreigners  Share of foreigners in tax receipts  Average tax 
1292  884  17%  47.2 
1296  419  16%  75.8 
1297  591  14%  48.8 
1313  357  6%  44.7 
In table 6 we can see that foreigners accounted for roughly 6% of the taxpayers and contributed 
between 14 and 17 percent of total tax receipts until 1313. In 1313 we see a marked decline in 
the number of foreigners and in their relative tax contributions. Earlier we showed that the 
smaller tax rolls of 1296 and 1313 are the result of the economic crisis prevailing at those years. 
In these years, the tax burden shifted to the more affluent. Thus, in 1296 we see that though their 
numbers drop by more than a half, foreigners contribute, roughly the same share of the taille as 
they did in 1292. However, in 1313 we observe an opposite trend of a decline in numbers and 
wealth of foreigners. Analysis of the tax records indicates that most of the drop can be explained 
by the expulsion of the Jews in 1305 (though they already disappear from the tax records in 
1297) and the large decline in the numbers of wealthy Italians.    15 
It is tempting to contribute the decline in the lure of Paris for foreigners to the general economic 
decline of the 1310s, which was accompanied by monetary disorders  (debasements). This was 
hardly an attractive economic environment for foreign merchants and bankers. Moreover, Phillip 
the Fair engaged in campaigns against the Jews and Templers – the bankers and money lenders 
of the time – which probably frightened Italian bankers out of Paris – potentially the next victims 
on the crown list.  
While highly suggestive, this evidence suggests that economic crisis and institutional disorder  - 
infringing on the property rights of minorities and bankers drove out some of the wealthiest tax 
payers out of Paris. By 1313, Paris seems to have lost its lure.
11 This finding supports claims that 
relative economic decline in Western Europe set in before the Black Death of 1346/8.  
Where did foreigners reside? Did they concentrate in one or two parishes or were they dispersed 
between neighborhoods? Table 7 presents the distribution of foreigners in the various parishes, 
listed in order of declining wealth, compared with the distribution of the native population. With 
the exception of the Jews, all foreigners were dispersed in the various neighborhoods, according 
to their wealth. However, foreigners tended to concentrate in the more affluent parishes. For 
example, 9.9 percent of taxpayers lived in the wealthiest parish of St. Jacques de la boucherie, 
whereas it was home to almost 20 percent of the Italian community of Paris. Almost half of all 
Italians resided in the three wealthiest parishes. Half of the Flemish and Germans in the top four 
parishes and the English and Scots in the top five parishes. This phenomenon is different from 
the traditional tendency of foreign merchants to live in enclaves or communes such as those that 
prevailed in the Levant. Paris was indeed a cosmopolitan city where foreigners could reside next 
                                                 
11 Herlihy () shows that not only did foreigners leave Paris, but that immigration to Paris from the south of France 
also decline by 1313.  These tests will be performed once all the data set is complete.   16 
door to the local population without the need to resort to living in closed quarters to protect 
themselves. The exception to this rule was the Jews who congregated in only two parishes
12. 
Finally, the large concentration of Italians and Jews in the parish of St. Merri suggests that this 
Parish was the home of money lenders. 
Table 7 




















St. Jacques de la boucherie  9.9%  15.8%  11.7%  13.5%  19.8%  10.2%   
St. Jean  5.6%  8.8%  4.3%  7.7%  3.6%  1.7%  17.1% 
La Cite  8.3%  9.6%  12.7%  4.8%  26.3%  13.6%   
St. Germain L’auxerrois  16.1%  13.2%  11.3%  24.0%  3.6%  20.3%   
St. Eustache  9.0%  8.8%  10.7%  5.8%  9.0%  18.6%   
St. Benoît  1.5%  1.8%  2.3%  1.9%   1.7%   
St. Gervais  6.5%  1.8%  5.3%  6.7%  2.4%  3.4%   
St. Merri  9.8%  5.3%  8.7%  5.8%  16.8%  3.4%  82.9% 
St Innocent – St, Opportune  0.6%  1.8%  0.7%      
St. Germain des Près  2.6%   2.0%  2.9%  6.0%    
St. Josse  0.5%   1.3%  1.0%  0.6%    
St. Nicolas des champs  5.8%  1.8%  6.7%  1.9%  5.4%  6.8%   
St. Pol  6.3%  4.4%  7.0%  7.7%  8.4%    
St. Leu – St Gille  3.0%  1.8%  1.7%  2.9%  1.8%  1.7%   
Ste Geneviève  2.8%  3.5%  4.3%  3.8%  0.6%  3.4%   
St. Hilaire  0.1%     1.0%     
St. Cosme  0.4%   0.3%      
St. Laurent  1.5%   1.3%  1.9%     
St. Séverin  4.6%  14.0%  6.0%  5.8%  1.2%  6.8%   
St. André des arts  1.0%  7.0%  1.3%  1.0%     
St. Sauver  1.6%   0.3%   0.6%  8.5%   
St. Nicolas de Chardonnay  0.5%     1.0%     
Notre Dame des champs  0.4%   0.3%      
St. Marcel  1.6%  0.9%  1.7%  1.9%     
 
                                                 
12 The heart of the Jewish  community is, to date,  in the Marais – their place of residence in the middle ages.   17 
5. Foreigners’ wealth and European wealth distribution. 
All European regions were represented in the Parisian tax roles, but the most prominent ones 
were the Italian city states, the Flemish, English, Scots, Germans and Jews (until 1296).  The 
average tax assessment of the various nationals (at least for the larger groups) allows us to 
attempt to construct the European wealth distribution.  
One may assume that migrants self select and therefore are not a random sample of their country 
of origin’s income distribution. We refer to two simple models that may account for the presence 
of foreigners in the city of Paris. The first suggests that these foreigners were migrants and the 
other that these were agents of international trading and banking firms. The migration model (see 
Hatton and Williamson (1998)) assumes that migration is influenced by a positive wage gap 
between host and country of origin and demographic (Malthusian) pressures associated with 
economic growth. In either case, the expected wealth, after migration, is greater or equal to what 
it could have been at home. The international firm’s agent model suggests that these agents 
would probably represent the wealth distribution of their counterparts at the home country
13.  
Table 8 shows the rankings of the largest groups of foreigners in Paris and the average for the 
entire French population. When compared with the entire French distribution is seems that the 
Germans, English and Scots would fit the Hatton Williamson (1988) model; their average wealth 
is equal or lower than the French average. These nationals probably migrated to Paris to better 
themselves which suggests that these areas were less affluent than Paris
14. The comparison of the 
number of taxpayers in 1296 (which did not include the poorer taxpayers) with 1297 allows to 
                                                 
13 From the Datini and Medici bank accounts (De Roover (1948, 1966)), it is plausible to suggest that junior partners 
and managers were usually sent to foreign offices of the firm. 
14 Jews of English origin were also the less affluent of their brethren.    18 
estimate the share of poor taxpayers among the foreigners’. We can see that the decline in 
taxpayers is correlated with our priors about the relative wealth distribution of the foreigners. 
The Scots, which were the poorest declined by two thirds in 1296, the English by 60 percent, and 
the Germans only by 40 percent.  
Table 8 
Analysis of Foreign Residents’ Income – according to Parisian tailles 
  1292  1296  1297  1313 
N  197  116  101  43 
Average tax  150.5  180.7  194.7  65.7 
Italians 
Max Tax  2290  1650  1090  450 
N  107  51  98  64 
Average tax  47.7  71.1  33.6  121.6 
Flemish 
Max Tax  1650  800  800  3000 
N  115  47  77  38 
Average tax  18.2  31.0  19.9  22.7 
Germans 
Max Tax  200  220  250  180 
N  306  92  218  154 
Average tax  8.3  29.8  11.8  19.9 
English 
Max Tax  200  440  180  450 
N  59  19  57  31 
Average tax  6.3  16.4  8.9  19.1 
Scots 
Max Tax  48  40  48  180 
N  87  80     
Average tax  28.9  24.7     
Jews 
Max Tax  490  300     
Non 
foreigners  
Average tax  15 32 19  44 
Not surprisingly, the affluent foreigners were the Italians and Flemish – representatives of the 
more advanced and prosperous regions in Europe during the commercial revolution. These   19 
groups probably included representatives of Italians and Flemish banking and trading firms in 
Paris and the elite of financiers and international merchants. As the data on maximum tax 
assessment show, individuals in these groups were the highest taxed in Paris – the richest of all 
residents.  
The Jews, an ethnic group rather than typical migrants, were wealthier than the average Parisian, 
second only to the Flemish and Italians. Their expulsion does not allow us to track changes in 
their numbers or wealth for the whole period. Nevertheless, it seems that the Jews and Italians 
were not subject to the exemptions made for the poorer citizens in 1296. The exclusion of the 
poorest taxpayers should have lowered their number and raised average tax. This does not 
happen in the case of these two groups. The tax rolls accounted for Jews and Lombard under 
separate accounts, which suggest that they were subject to a different treatment than other 
foreigners. The expulsion of the Jews in 1305 and the decline in the number of (wealthy) Italian 
taxpayers and their average tax assessment allude to the hardships faced by groups associated 
with finance and money lending during times of fiscal crisis
15. 
 
IV Measures of inequality 
1. An overview 
The findings reported by Van Zanden (1995) point to a very high measure of inequality during 
the Renaissance and the early modern period. The Parisian tax rolls extend these findings to a 
much earlier period. Table 9 provides Gini inequality coefficients for the four Parisan  tailles 
                                                 
15 See also the default of Edward III in 1326 on his loans to the Italian banks of Bardi and Peruzzi.   20 
analyzed in this paper and two, previously unused,  contemporary tax lists from London and 
more recent data on Florence and Zwolle taken from Van Zanden (1995). 
The similarity of the statistics reported over such a long period suggests that very high inequality 
prevailed in European cities for centuries. Moreover, this similarity seems to be independent of 
geographical location, time or average income. Pre-industrial urban economies were all 
characterized by high polarity: few very rich citizens, a small affluent class and large masses of 
relatively poor, but nevertheless taxable, citizens.  
Table 9 
Comparative inequality measures: 1292-1750 
City Year    Number  of 
hearths 
Gini coefficient  Top 1%  Top 5% 
Paris 1292  14509  0.75 26  52 
Paris 1296  5661  0.61 17  38 
Paris 1297  9916  0.69 20  44 
Paris 1313  6108  0.79 25  55 
London 1292  791  0.70 15  43 
London 1319  1600  0.76 34  57 
Florence 1427  10000  0.79 27  67 
Zwolle 1750  2438  0.67 ?  ? 
A feature that emerges from the data presented in Table 9 is that smaller samples, from the same 
city, were usually associated with lower (tax payments) inequality. This is owing to the decision 
by city authorities to exempt the poor and shift the burden to the rich. While taxation was 
proportional with respect to wealth, the truncation of the tax assessments for citizens with lower   21 
wealth is in effect progressive, a surprising result in light of tendencies by many historians to 
highlight class struggle and unfair taxation of the poor
16. Therefore, though we do not have 
wealth data, before-tax inequality may have risen in crisis years and after-tax inequality may 
have declined. 
Another feature that emerges from the comparison over time is that inequality increased during 
periods of economic crisis.  A comparison of the wealth distribution in 1292 and 1313 shows an 
increase in inequality despite the exemption made for the poor. One may argue that this result is 
due to the fact that we are measuring taxes rather than wealth. If the same tax burden is shared 
among fewer taxpayers, average tax payment will increase. Therefore, the higher tax burden on 
the rich may be erroneously interpreted as an increase in wealth inequality. On the other hand, it 
ca be argued that the tax burden is shared among a more equal group of tax payers than before. 
The experience of 1292, 1296, and 1297, shows that the second effect dominated the wealth 
distribution in Paris, namely, that the truncation of the tax distribution from bellow, lowered 
inequality. Coupled with higher inequality measures from London (1319), it is tempting to 
conclude that the recession of the 1310s brought about by bad harvests, was much more severe 
than that of the mid 1290s and increased inequality through the prolonged recessionary effect of 
rising wheat prices on the less affluent taxpayers. 
2. Measures of inequality within and between groups 
An interesting question is whether the high inequality as captured by the Gini coefficient is the 
outcome of inequality between social groups or does inequality prevail even within subgroups of 
                                                 
16 I intend to analyze the urban self-taxation mechanism in detail in future work.    22 
the population. In this subsection we break the population of taxpayers into subgroups along 
gender, occupation, origin and occupational attributes such as skill and the possession of capital.  
a. Gender 
The tax rolls contain large numbers of women heads of households who paid taxes. While there 
was a large contingent of chambermaids (248 in the entire data), women were involved in almost 
all the sectors of the urban economy (Herlihy(1995)).  Table 10 shows that women comprised 
about 15% of the taxpayers. In 1296 and 1297 there seems to be a very narrow gender gap in 
terms of wealth (compared with 20% in the U.S today). Herlihy (1995) claims that in many 
respects, Paris of the end of the 13
th century was open to women on a scale unmatched in the 
centuries that followed.  Inequality among the sexes is practically identical, reinforcing the claim 
that with the exception of a relatively small wealth gap, no gender bias emerges in their 
respective wealth distributions. Again, the difference between the recessions of 1296 and 1313 is 
instructive: in both years the relatively poor were exempt from taxation and women’s share 
among taxpayers declined suggesting that they were overrepresented in the low tail of the wealth 
distribution. Nevertheless, in 1313 not only their share drops but the gender gap widens, 
suggesting as we observed above, that the recession of 1313 was qualitatively different from that 
of 1296 – it was probably much more severe.  
Table 10 
The gender gap – Paris: 1292-1313 










1292 13.7  16%  0.75  17.5  84%  0.75  28%   23 
1296 32  13%  0.57  35.6  87%  0.61  11% 
1297 18.8  15%  0.66  21.2  85%  0.70  13% 
1313 35  12%  0.79  44.8  88%  0.79  28%   24 
b. Country of origin 
How did the various nationals fare in terms of their income distributions? Were migrants a more 
homogenous group than native French?  Table 11 presents inequality measures for taxpayers 
from larger contingents of foreign nationals in Paris. It shows that there were substantial 
differences in inequality among the group of various origins. The Flemish were the least equal of 
all foreigners followed by the Italians, Jews, English, Germans and Scots. Are these differences 
indicative of income distributions at the home country or are they unique to the sample of 
foreigners in Paris? Van Zanden (1995) shows that areas with low urbanization rates had lower 
inequality. Therefore, that the Flemish appear at the top of our list is not surprising as it was 
probably the most densely populated urban region of Europe, followed by the Italian City states. 
Germany, England and surely Scotland were much more rural. Our comparison with London in 
Table 9 allows us to confirm that inequality in London resembled that of the English in Paris
17. If 
indeed inequality is related to high urbanization rates and economic growth, then observing the 
income distributions of foreigners may allow us to infer about their home country’s relative rates 
of urbanization and economic growth. 
Taken as a whole, inequality of wealth among foreigners was larger than that of French born 
population. However, as can be seen in Table 11, these differences in inequality are explained by 
high inequality between these groups, while the within group inequality is lower than that of the 
native population. Therefore, the population of foreigners in Paris was less unequal than the 
general population. This result is not surprising since the foreigner’s communities did not include 
the very poor. Nevertheless, a finding of a large measure of inequality between the groups 
                                                 
17 Note however, that London was the largest urban center and therefore had slightly higher inequality than the 
English in our sample.    25 
supports the claim, made above, that foreigners’ wealth distributions were distinct and resembled 
the income distribution at their respective home countries and can be used to infer about 
differences in inequality between regions in European at the end of the 13
th century. 
Table 11 
Between and within inequality measures by country of origin 
  1292 1296 1297 1313 
Italians 0.73  0.62 0.68  0.69 
Flemish 0.81  0.64 0.70  0.85 
Germans 0.69  0.54 0.64  0.61 
English 0.66  0.57 0.62  0.75 
Scots 0.56  0.31 0.57  0.73 
Jews 0.65  0.63     
Total sample  0.75  0.61 0.69  0.79 
Theil’s measure of inequality  1,72  1.06 1.54  1.76 
With group inequality  1.1  0.70 0.86  1.44 
Between group inequality  0.61  0.36 0.68  0.32 
Theil’s measure of inequality – total sample  1.37  0.81 1.07  1.48 
An interesting insight that can be gleaned from Table 11 is that Jews had a relatively unequal 
wealth distribution, in fact it was quite close to that of the Italians. If this finding is 
representative of other Jewish communities’ wealth distributions, then the he popular belief that 
Jewish communities were more homogenous and egalitarian than the rest of the population is not 
borne by our data.  
 c. Place of residence 
In the previous section we saw that the city of Paris was divided into parishes of unequal wealth. 
Can the place of residence of citizens explain the overall inequality in Paris? The picture that   26 
emerges from table 12 is consistent with our earlier findings (and those of Van Zanden(1995)), 
that inequality is positively correlated with average income and negatively correlated with the 
size of population in the subgroup. Moreover, almost all the inequality is explained by inequality 
within the parishes rather than between them. This finding suggests that most parishes shared the 
same features of the Parisian income distribution and, with the exception of the tiny Parish of St. 
Hilaire, were not homogenous communities in their own right. We can not identify an exclusive 
neighborhood that included only the very rich or only the very poor.  
d. Occupational inequality  
As we saw earlier, the various occupations differed in income and in numbers. Unlike preceding 
decompositions of the Parisian society into subgroups, we tread on less secure grounds when we 
attempt to analyze inequality within and between occupations because only a subset of the 
population was identified according to their occupation. As a result, we are focusing on the lower 
(on average) wealth part of the distribution and we should bear in mind this caveat as we attempt 
to interpret the results.    27 
Table 12 






St. Jacques de la boucherie  1429  27.1 0.78 
St. Jean  807  22.4 0.81 
La Cite  1208  21.4 0.76 
St. Germain L’auxerrois  2328  21.3 0.75 
St. Eustache  1306  18.7 0.71 
St. Benoît  219  14.6 0.72 
St. Gervais  938  14.3 0.72 
St. Merri  1426  13.9 0.76 
St Innocent – St, Opportune  82 
13.2 0.64 
St. Germain des Près  383  12.5 0.61 
St. Josse  73  11.9 0.62 
St. Nicolas des champs  844  10.4 0.70 
St. Pol  913  9.1 0.69 
St. Leu – St Gille  437  8.9 0.72 
Ste Geneviève  405  8.5 0.60 
St. Hilaire  20  8.3 0.41 
St. Cosme  59  7.7 0.60 
St. Laurent   213  7.5 0.52 
St. Séverin  664  6.5 0.68 
St. André des arts  146  6.5 0.63 
St. Sauver  230  6  0.55 
St. Nicolas de Chardonnay  79  5.7 0.61 
Notre Dame des champs  62  5.4 0.51 
St. Marcel  231  4.4 0.62 
Theil’s measure of inequality  1.37     
With group inequality  1.26     
Between group inequality  0.11     
Theil’s measure of inequality – 
total sample 
1.37 
   
   28 
Table 13 confirms our findings from previous sub-categories, namely, that higher wealth is 
associated with higher inequality. However, upon closer inspection we can see that the 
differences in wealth distribution are quite small when compared to differences in average tax. In 
fact, among those classified in our sample, all the inequality is explained by inequality within 
subgroups. Bearing the selection bias in mind, this result is quite surprising as traditional 
accounts of the period suggest that the non-entrepreneurial urban classes were more homogenous 
than the mercantile elites. Assuming that the non-classified individuals belonged to the 
mercantile elite would widen the wealth and inequality gap between them and the rest of 
society.
18 Nevertheless, by modern standards, even the more egalitarian groups had very high 
measures of inequality.  
Table 13 




Top 1%  Top 
10% 
arts & crafts  2465  11.4 0.61 0.15 0.50 
Trade and finance  2283  18.7 0.66 0.18 0.54 
Professionals 512  12.5 0.57 0.16 0.49 
Labor 495  7.7 0.60 0.19 0.49 
Services 434  14.2 0.60 0.22 0.52 
Army and clergy  223  16.5 0.60 0.13 0.48 
Theil’s measure of inequality  0.87         
Within group inequality  0.84         
Between group inequality  0.03         
Theil’s measure of inequality 
– non classified  1.06  34.1  0.71 
 
 
                                                 
18 Assuming that all the non-classified are merchants we obtain a Gini coefficient of 0.81 (compared with 0.66 for 
classified merchants) and 0.60 for the rest of the occupations.   29 
Since there is little difference in inequality between occupations, broadly defined, we turn to 
examine two additional measures related to the labor market. We break taxpayers with reported 
occupations in to three skill and capital categories groups (as described above). Table 14 present 
the breakdown according to skills. The most noticeable difference is the general education 
(reading, math skills and professional education) wealth premium, while the premium for 
artisanal education, mainly through the guild system is not very large when compared with the 
unskilled
19. Again, the higher income category has a higher inequality measure, nevertheless, we 
can account for most of the inequality by the inequality within each category.  
Table 14 




Top 1%  Top 
10% 
Artisans 3724  8.9 0.65  16  55 
General Education  1578  15.5 0.77  21  60 
Unskilled 1340  7.1 0.64  11  52 
Theil’s measure of inequality  1.18         
Within group inequality  1.14         
Between group inequality  0.04         
In Table 15 we present the breakdown according to the capital required in the profession 
recorded by the tax assessors. We notice that merchants, with circulating capital enjoyed higher 
average wealth than those who owned productive equipment – mainly crafts’ guild members. 
The inequality ranking adheres to the general rule of higher inequality and higher average 
earnings. But the differences in this category are smaller than any other breakdown of taxpayers 
                                                 
19 Note that the skill and capital variables were derived from the occupations and not from the actual characteristics 
of the taxpayers.   30 
with known occupations. As before, if we assume that those unidentified are the wealthy 
merchants – the premium gaps described here can only increase. 
Table 15 




Top 1%  Top 
10% 
Circulating 2282  18.7 0.66 0.18 0.54 
Productive 2004  13.2 0.62 0.17 0.54 
No capital  2268  10.4 0.60 0.16 0.54 
Theil’s measure of inequality  0.87         
Within group inequality  0.84         
Between group inequality  0.03         
We can estimate the relative importance of skill and capital by calculating the wealth premium 
associated with skill and capital. The premium for general human capital over artisanal skills is 
75 percent while the premium for circulating capital (cash) over productive capital is only 40 
percent. The premium of skill over unskilled and productive capital over no capital is 25 percent. 
In medieval Paris, as today, human capital seemed to command a premium over all other sorts of 
capital. 
e. Was Paris really so unequal? 
Since the evidence from the large categories we used above, each holding dozens if not hundreds 
of different occupations, all point in the same direction, we attempted to take a closer look at 
some of the widespread professions and occupations chosen on the basis of their number of 
observations.   31 
Table 16 provides the details of the average tax and Gini inequality coefficients for twenty major 
occupations. The picture that emerges from this detailed analysis is different than the one we 
obtained above. While shopkeepers (retail and wholesale) represent the general level of 
inequality we found earlier, the more specific professions exhibit substantially lower degrees of 
inequality.   
The classical occupations often used in early modern wage comparisons are construction  and 
weaving. These two professions have a similar average tax assessment and inequality measures. 
Nevertheless, even in these occupations inequality is relatively high by modern standards. It 
seems that guild regulations had a smaller effect than presumed. Guild and professional 
regulation that was thought to have created obstacles in the labor and goods markets seems to 
have played a minor role in Paris in the middle ages. True, inequality in the guild controlled 
occupations was lower than in the unregulated mercantile sectors (see the relatively low 
inequality measure for bakers), but was very high by modern standards. The high variance in 
wealth among guild controlled occupation casts serious doubts on attempts to use a small sample 
of wages from these sectors in international and historical comparisons. 
The division by professions also shows that a substantial part of total inequality can be explained 
by inequality between the various professions. We may conclude that Paris was divided between 
three classes of occupations:   1. the mercantile and financial sector which was very unequal and 
accounted for the polarized nature of the income distribution. 2. artisans and professionals who 
also exhibited a large measure of inequality within and between professions. It seems that guilds 
and regulations may be responsible for smaller inequality than that of the unregulated financial 
sector, nevertheless, even guild controlled sectors exhibited large scope for inequality and   32 
Table 16 
Between and within inequality measures by selected professions  
 1292  1297 
Profession N  Average 
tax 
Gini N  Average 
tax 
Gini 
All Paris    16.9  0.75    20.9  0.69 
Shop keepers  70  28.4  0.76  73  28.8  0.59 
Bakers 61  19.4  0.54  131  17.6  0.47 
Taverniers 89  16.9  0.46  400  24.0  0.52 
Goldsmiths 118  9.2  0.54  192  26.4  0.68 
Barbers 148  8.9  0.65  111  10.4  0.56 
Barrel makers  70  8.2  0.62  78  10.5  0.49 
Masons 96  7.4  0.62  77  8.0  0.45 
Weavers 84  7.2  0.61  163  8.6  0.54 
Shoemakers 227  7.2  0.54  244  9.5  0.53 
Sergeants 97  7.1  0.53  134  12.3  0.48 
Belt makers  77  7.0  0.57  87  9.3  0.47 
Candle makers  78  6.6  0.60  66  9.3  0.55 
Peddlers 118  6.1  0.58  114  8.2  0.51 
Tailors 125  5.7  0.56  125  7.7  0.55 
Grocers 122  5.4  0.59  198  5.8  0.46 
Apprentices 325  5.1  0.55  93  8.3  0.52 
Carpenter – 
constructions 95  4.9  0.48  86  7.7  0.47 
Furriers 210  4.6  0.60  223  10.4  0.64 
Chambermaids 190  2.8  0.39  45  4.8  0.51 
Sandal makers  135  2.3  0.34  122  3.6  0.35 
Theil’s measure of 
inequality 
0.85      0.73     
Within group 
inequality 
0.68      0.58     
Between group 
inequality 
0.17      0.15       33 
differential compensation. 3. unskilled labor (chambermaids are a good example) that was 
relatively poor and relatively equal.  
V.  The wealthy elite – from bankers to drapers. 
The wealthy top percentile of the tax payers’ distribution was selected from all the rolls we 
studied. This allows us to construct a more detailed and linked data set for this group.  The top 
percentile was made up of individuals and companies. The companies were mainly engaged in 
banking and were mainly Italian. Table 17 shows the descriptive statistics of the wealthy top 
percentile in Paris. We can note that although average taxes went up from 1292 onwards (Table 
3) the tax paid by the very wealthy declined from 1292 to 1297. Furthermore, we note that the 
highest tax payment was borne out by a company between 1292 to 1297 (The banking firm of 
Gandoulfe from Lombardy in 1292 and 1296and Ace of Lombardy in 1297) and an individual in 
1313, Wasselin of Ghent who was a draper.  We also note the decline of the number of 
companies from 1292 (44) to 1313 (8) which reflects to a large extent the capital flight of the 
Italian Bankers following defaults on his debts by Philip the Fair and his liquidation of the 
Templar order in 1307.  
The very wealthy lived on the rive droit , largely in the Parishes of St. Germain LwAuxerrois, 
and St. Jacque, the richest of all lived in the cite.  Table 18 shows where wealth was concentrated 
in Paris. In accordance with the picture we portrayed above, the very wealthy were dispersed in a 
number of neighborhoods, rather than congregating together in one of them.    34 
With the exception of the Italians, the very wealthy were largely French (Table 19). Although the 
wealthiest were Italian and Flemish It is again, interesting to note the steady decline of the Italian 
population  (and it wealth) from 1292 to 1313.  
Table 17 
The wealthy top percentile, Paris 1292-1313 
Individuals and companies: Average tax and maximum tax payment 
 
 
  Year N Mean  Max 
Total  166  372  2290 
Individuals  122  358  1880 
Companies 
1292 
44  411  2290 
Total  148  360  2850 
Individuals  128  314  1650 
Companies 
1296 
20  650  2850 
Total  146  348  1090 
Individuals  118  302  960 
Companies 
1297 
28  543  1090 
Total  144  535  2308 
Individuals  136  540  2308 
Companies 
1313 
8  459  923 
The profession of the very rich changed from Bankers to Drapers, with the disappearance of 
Bankers from Paris (table 20).  While Paris of the second half of the thirteenth century could 
boast a large number of Italian banks who engaged in financial intermediation and provided 
liquidity for the Parisian merchant community, the measures taken by Philip the Fair transformed 
Paris (France) into a lesser developed economy. Though closer ties with Flanders, following a 
series of wars, helped Paris become a center for trade in textiles, the absence of banks is striking.    35 
Table 18 
Place of residence of the wealthy percentile, Paris 1292-1313 





  1292 1297 1313 
Parish  N Mean  Max  N Mean  Max  N Mean  Max 
St. Germain L’auxerrois  30  324  800  31  323  880  24  709  3000 
St. Eustache  13  368  550  10  224  300  15  590  1050 
St. Sauver              1  400  400 
St. Leu – St Gille  2  320  440        3  430  480 
St Innocent – St, Opportune        4  340  380  4  802  1800 
St. Laurent                   
St. Josse        1  200  200  2  900  900 
St. Nicolas des champs  5  444  1080  3  285  300  8  690  1800 
St. Merri  15  407  2290  18  357  980  16  630  1200 
St. Jacques de la boucherie  37  378  1080  38  390  1090  41  695  1800 
St. Gervais  12  264  480  6  308  490  7  870  1500 
St. Jean  15  478  1650  12  365  800  4  765  900 
St. Pol  3  200  200  2  200  200  1  450  450 
La Cite  17  488  1880  19  468  1090  18  782  2700 
St. Séverin  1  200  200             
St. André des arts                   
St. Cosme                   
St. Benoît  1  200  200  1  200  200       
St. Hilaire                   
St. Nicolas de Chardonnay                   
Ste Geneviève        1  300  300       
Notre Dame des champs                   
St. Marcel                   
St. Germain des Près  1  300  300               36 
The effect was to raise increase the prosperity of money changers and goldsmiths who took over 
some the operations of the Italian bankers. Since the city was committed to raising the same 
amount of taxes, 10,000 livres, in 1313, the disappearance of the Italian bankers probably 
increased the tax burden on the remaining elite. Thus, we can see that the tax assessments of the 
remaining occupations rise dramatically in 1313, which does not necessarily mean that these 
wealthy tax payers were economically better off. 
Table 19 
Country of origin of the wealthy percentile, Paris 1292-1313 




  1292 1296 1297 1313 
Country  N Mean Max N Mean Max N Mean Max N Mean Max 
France  31  276  520  27  286  690  28  266  700  36  658  1800 
Germany  1  200  200  1  220  220  1  250  250       
England  1  200  200  1  440  440        1  450  450 
Flemish  3  940  1650  3  576  800  3  576  880  3  1640  3000 
Italian  44  463  2290  35  441  1650  29  529  1090  1  360  360 
Jews  1  200  200  3  266  300             
 




Professions of the wealthy percentile, Paris 1292-1313 
Average tax and maximum tax payment 
 
  1292-7 1313 
Professions  N  Mean  Max  N  Mean  Max 
Banker  11  613  2290       
Draper  7  311  580  19  920  3000 
Goldsmith  6  263  332  2  960  1500 
Wine merchant  5  380  690  2  480  600 
Merchant  5  266  320  5  816  1800 
Inn Keeper  5  274  380  3  720  1200 
Money changer  4  250  400  5  555  750 
Spice dealer  3  290  380  8  641  1800 
Doctor  1    320  0     
The pooling of the data allows to look at the dynamics of the population of the top percentile of 
tax payers. Table 21 shows the evolution of the very wealthy. From the 166 wealthiest residents 
of Paris listed in 1292 only 74 (45%) appeared in subsequent rolls, and only 12 survived the 
entire period. However, those that survived to 1296 and 1297 were on average wealthier than 
those that did not survive and were wealthier, on average, than newcomers in 1296 and 1297. 
However, the relative standing of the very wealthy changed from 1292 to 126 and 1297. The 
Spearman correlation value is low and insignificant which means that there was a lot of wealth 
mobility in this group of the very rich over the period 1292 – 1296/7. In 1296 over 50% of the 
very rich were nouveau riche.  Note that the new comers had smaller fortunes than incumbents. 
Moving from 1296 to 1297, the turnover is much smaller – only 25% newcomers. In a year, the 
ranking among the very rich changed much less tan over the four year period from 1292 to 1296.   38 
We find a significant, although not very high, Spearman correlation value. Finally, in 1313 the 
landscape of the elite changed completely – the Italians of course left, but even among the locals, 
the turnover was high – 80% of the rich were newcomers. However, the pattern that we observed 
earlier that the incumbents, have on average, higher incomes prevails. It is interesting to note that 
those that survived the years and made it to 1313 more than doubled their wealth from there 
initial assessments. To conclude, we can see that the elites were very unstable and changed 
substantially over a generation. Nevertheless, those that persisted over time increased their 
wealth and ranking very nicely.   39 
 
Table 21 
Transition matrix of the wealthy percentile, Paris 1292-1313 
Average tax and maximum tax payment 
 
Year   Transitions  N Mean Max  Spearman 
correlation 
Total   166  372  2290   
One time 
mention 
 92  356  1880   
Repeat 
mention 
 74  393  2290   
1296 67  404  2290  0.167 




1313 12  286  480  0 
1296 Total   148  360  2850   
One time 
mention 
 40  342  770   
Repeat 
mention 
 108  367  2850   
New 
comers 
 76  294  930   
From  1292 67  413  2290  0.167 
1297 96  359  2850  0.369** 
 
Continue 
to  1313 17  256  360  -0.208 
Total   146  348  1090   
One time 
mention 
 43  370  1090   
Repeat 
mention 
 103  340  1090   
New 
comers 
 38  350  1090   
1292 58  363  960  0.147  From 




1313 20  267  490  0.388 
1313 Total   144  535  2308   
New 
Comers 
 120  512  2308   
1292 12  479  1385  0 
1296 17  651  1962  -0.208 
 
From 
1297 20  625  1962  0.388   40 
 
Conclusions 
The results of a preliminary investigation into the Parisian taille of Philip the Fair presented in 
this paper shows that Paris exhibited a large degree of inequality comparable with that of 
contemporary London , Florence in 1427 and early modern Holland. Inequality was high in 
every possible category: gender, residence, country of origin, occupation skills and capital. It 
appears that inequality was positively correlated with average wealth and population size. The 
more affluent parishes were in the central areas of the right bank, outside the walls, wealth  was 
substantially lower. The only discernable difference between groups is measured in the case of 
foreign nationals and professions: There are significant differences between the very unequal 
income distributions of the most wealthy foreigners – the Italians and Flemish and the less 
affluent ones – the English and Scots and there are significant differences in inequality between 
the prominent professions and less prominent ones.  
In modern inequality distributions, the wealthiest and most advanced countries have lower 
degrees of inequality than lesser developed countries. In medieval Paris, and possibly all over 
Western Europe, large and wealthy urban centers were associated with extreme degrees of 
income inequality, that spanned across subcategories. Given the almost progressive nature of the 
taxation scheme of the taille, it seems that inequality was the outcome of unregulated market 
forces. Inequality was not an outcome of the feudal system, as the landed elite were not part of 
the tax rolls. Marxist inequality based on concentration of industrial capital can not explain it 
either. It appears, then, that individual ability and skills were differentially rewarded and there   41 
seemed to have been a large premium on human capital. In its emphasis on human capital, rather 
than land or capital, medieval Paris was similar to the information age economy.   
The data pose an interesting question for growth theorists: what was the causal relationship 
between inequality, wealth and population growth? In recent growth models the return to human 
capital induces more investment in children quality and this tends to lower population growth 
and produces a blessed cycle of low fertility, high human capital and sustained growth. The 
incentives for investing in human capital in medieval Paris were not absent. Given the high 
inequality in wages, the option value of education must have been very high. The large share of 
migrants and foreigners suggests that option of going to a large urban center increased the value 
of education in the countryside and periphery. If recent growth models have general validity, 
urban centers in medieval Europe should have behaved according to the post-Malthusian 
models.
20 At the same time, it seems that inequality was associated with higher population 
growth perhaps because only in ever expanding markets and demands the relatively inelastic 
supply of human capital can reap such rewards. Yet, it seems that the pressure of population 
growth on landed resources, in the end, derailed the commercial revolution. Alternatively, should 
we add political economy effects to growth models: could a more inequality averse society might 
have reduced inequality by redistributing income in such a way as to reduce the vulnerability of 
the lower classes to high food prices? The comparison of medieval Europe with the post-
industrial society could help us get closer to answering these important questions. 
                                                 
20 For example Galor Weil (2000)   42 
Data Sources: 
Ekwall Eilert, (1951), Two Early London Subsidy Rolls:  Edited, with an Introduction, 
Commentaries, and Indices of Taxpayers, Lund : C. W. K. Gleenrup, Acta Regiae Societatis 
Humaniorum litterarum Lundensis ; 48 
Geraud Hercule, (1837), Paris Sous Philippe le Bel, Paris. 
Michaelsson Karl, (1951), Le Livre de la Taille de Paris l’an 1313, Goteborg 
Michaelsson Karl, (1958), Le Livre de la Taille de Paris l’an 1296, Goteborg 
Michaelsson Karl, (1962), Le Livre de la Taille de Paris l’an 1297, Goteborg 
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